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Article: 
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman’s 2005 best-seller, “The World is Flat,” has conquered public 
opinion. Ask a group of business leaders if they’ve read his book, and nearly every hand will be raised. Among 
the portion of the general public who read books, it is now widely accepted that the world is indeed “flat,” i.e. 
that globalization has transformed the world economy by making distance unimportant and borders irrelevant. 
Friedman claims that “in a flat world, you can innovate without having to emigrate.” 
 
But while the book has persuaded the public, many academic experts are deeply skeptical. Some have pointed 
out that there’s really nothing new in Friedman’s book. Long before Friedman started interviewing Indian and 
Chinese entrepreneurs, technological advances such as the telephone and the automobile were altering the role 
of geography in the economy. Two of the most significant developments in 20th century America were 
commuting and suburban sprawl, and neither was caused by the Internet or the other new technologies named 
by Friedman. 
 
One can’t help but be sympathetic to the plight of popularizers like Friedman. They bring big ideas to the 
public, and for their efforts they get criticized by the experts. However, popularizers who rely on anecdotes and 
assertions rather than solid economic data make easy targets. One critic has noted that there isn’t a single table 
or data footnote in Friedman’s entire book. 
 
The World is Spiky 
One early Friedman critic was the economic geographer Richard Florida, well known for his concept of “the 
creative class.” In a 2005 article in The Atlantic titled “The World is Spiky,” Florida noted that when various 
measures of economic activity are mapped so the intensity in a given place is represented by the height of a 
spike, the world doesn’t look so flat. It looks spiky. There may be spikes in new places, such as Bangalore and 
Shanghai, but the tallest spikes are still in New York, London, and Tokyo. 
 
Some measures, such as patents and scientific citations, show little evidence of flattening. Florida argued that 
“globalization has increased the returns to innovation [and] strengthened the lure that innovation centers hold 
for our planet’s best and brightest, reinforcing the spikiness of wealth and economic production.” In other 
words, it still pays talented Indians to come to Silicon Valley to commercialize their ideas. You can innovate 
without emigrating, but you’ll probably emigrate. 
 
Florida’s spikes show that within countries, the opposite of flattening is happening. Globalization appears to be 
increasing the divide between urban and rural areas. In China, one of Friedman’s showcase countries, urban 
incomes are now triple those in rural areas. What we see in the U.S. is less extreme but no less vexing. The 
North Carolina Rural Economic Development Center has found that urban incomes in the state are about 32 
percent higher than rural incomes. With the decline first of agriculture and then of manufacturing, what are rural 
counties in North Carolina to do? 
 
 
 
Local Still Holds Sway 
The latest contribution to the field of what we might call World-is-Flat Revisionism is Harvard business 
professor Pankaj Ghemawat’s new book, “Redefining Global Strategy.” Ghemawat’s book is ultimately a set of 
prescriptions of how businesses must navigate cultural differences in order to succeed in the world economy. 
But for the first third of the book he delves into economics to make the case that it’s the differences among 
countries that matter most. 
 
Ghemawat argues that the extent of globalization is much less than Friedman and other writers would have us 
believe. Some of these writers see globalization as humanity’s economic savior while others see it as an 
unmitigated disaster. Ghemawat argues that neither of these extreme views is accurate because globalization 
simply hasn’t advanced to the point to allow it to be either savior or disaster. “Most types of economic activity 
that can be conducted either within or across borders,’ he notes, “are still quite localized by country.” 
 
Ghemawat refers to the current situation as semiglobalization, claiming that “levels of cross-border integration 
are generally increasing and, in many instances, setting new records, but fall far short of complete integration 
and will continue to do so for decades.” He claims that so much of what we think we know about globalization 
is based on anecdotes and analogies, whereas he prefers to see what the data can tell us. 
 
When Ghemawat looks at economic data, he finds more evidence of local connectivity than of international 
linkage. For example, foreign direct investment (i.e. capital flows that cross national borders) accounts for less 
than 10 percent of all capital formation. National borders are crossed by similarly small percentages of total 
stock-market investment, patenting, merchandise trade, and even telephone calls. 
 
One of the mistakes that Friedman and others make is to confuse the capacity for international integration with 
the reality that such integration is taking place. Friedman’s anecdotes show that it’s become possible for ideas 
and innovations to flow anywhere. But how representative are those examples? Not particularly, according to 
the data cited by both Florida and Ghemawat. Cultural differences and simple economics often combine to 
favor localized solutions. 
 
Let’s take direct capital investment as an example. The saying is that capital knows no borders, and the dramatic 
innovations in the technology of capital flows have led many to embrace this saying uncritically. But while 
capital can flow across borders, it prefers to stay close to home, as any funding-starved entrepreneur can tell 
you. Direct investing is a hands-on activity, and investors and lenders like to know a lot about the businesses to 
which they’re providing capital. It’s hard to do that when the business is halfway around the world. 
 
Another example is provided by U.S.-Canada trade, the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. In 
spite of strong similarities and affinity between the two countries, as well as the trade-promoting effects of 
NAFTA, trade between Canadian provinces is five times higher than with similarly sized and equally distant 
U.S. states. Even when cultures seem similar, economic data reveal that they’re not so similar as to make 
borders and geography irrelevant. 
 
Virtual Borders 
What about the Internet? Its evolution is one of the reasons that Friedman believes the world is now flat. But 
according to Ghemawat, Web and email traffic within countries has increased much faster than traffic between 
countries. As someone who gets most of his emails from other people on the UNCG campus, this doesn’t 
surprise me. In fact, a big chunk of my emails come from within my own building! 
 
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, the authors of “Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World,” 
make similar points. For example, many websites ask the visitor to select his/her country. But if the Internet is 
borderless, why would websites maintain de facto international borders? Is it because of clumsy government 
regulation? Goldmith and Wu show that virtual borders on the Internet actually arose from within. Even aside 
from language issues, users in different cultures demand different types of Internet experiences. These borders 
may be reinforced by governments but they weren’t created by them. 
 
It’s true that many economic trends are headed in the direction of increased globalization. But the data indicate 
that those trends are weaker than is claimed by Friedman and others. In the meantime, Ghemawat argues, in a 
semiglobalized world it’s unwise for governments and businesses to accept uncritically the notion that the world 
is already flat. For now at least, cultural forces are stronger than the forces of globalization. 
